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Abstract 
 
The displacement of over five million Syrian refugees in the past six years has 
brought much needed attention to issues of forced migration. Today, the majority of the 
world’s refugees and internally displaced reside in urban areas of middle to low-income 
states, particularly in Asia and Africa. There is, however, a significant gap in research on 
self-settled refugees in the Middle East and their integration into host countries. In 
addition, much of the literature that does exist focuses on policies regarding labor policies 
yet ignores housing and settlement pattern issues and its impact on integration and 
community growth. This research aims to provide a historically contextualized analysis 
of policies’—specifically housing and employment’s—impact on integration within 
Jordan. The research includes an analysis based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index 
(MIPEX) in conjunction with an analysis of labor market and housing integration. This 
research finds the historical context and institutional barriers for refugees have led to 
negative refugee integration outcomes. Syrian refugees in Jordan have been unable to 
develop ethnic communities that would facilitate social mobility and future spatial 
integration. The paper concludes by suggesting characteristics of an improved refugee 





Keywords: forced migration, integration/assimilation, policy analysis, protracted refugee 
situation 
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Introduction 
 The ubiquitous images of refugees struggling across the Mediterranean or living 
in prison-like camps, while important to document, makes invisible how a majority of 
refugees across the globe actually live. According to the Refugee Compacts (2017:x) 
report, around 76% of the world’s refugees live outside of the typical camp, and have 
self-settled in other settlements such as urban, peri-urban and rural areas. This trend is not 
new, and existed prior to the UNHCR’s 2009 policy change to address self-settled 
refugees. In addition, while western countries—especially Europe—have seen an 
increase in refugees fleeing to their borders, over 85% of the world’s refugees continue to 
reside within middle to low-income countries in the ‘Global South’ (Huang et al. 2016). 
The limited agency of refugees and the increased housing demand creates high 
vulnerabilities from a housing perspective within the refugee population. These 
vulnerabilities can compound and create more issues such as physically distancing 
refugees from refugee specific aid centers (3RP 2016:40). Due to a dearth of research on 
these self-settled Global-South refugees, particularly from a housing and settlement 
perspective, this research aims to provide an understanding of these unique circumstances 
in Jordan. 
 Refugee situations, which often lead to protracted refugee situations (PRS), are 
most often handled by a number of nongovernmental organizations: most prominently the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This is just one pivotal piece to the 
international refugee regime: a form of global humanitarian governance that is “no longer 
inherently good; instead, it can be associated with either emancipation or domination” 
(Barnett 2013:382). Each host country involves a network of UNHCR, non-governmental 
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aid agencies, donor states, and the host country itself. Such a broad array of actors creates 
diverse policies and practices depending on the host country. As a country with a large 
refugee population, as well as a long history as a host state, Jordan provides a unique 
opportunity for forced migration policy analysis in regards to refugee integration: one of 
the durable solutions set out by the UNHCR.  
The Middle Eastern country of Jordan has a unique history as one of the receiving 
‘Southern’ states, with steady flows beginning with Palestinians since 1948, to the recent 
influx of neighboring Syrians since 2011. The lengthy history, range of policies, and 
diversity of refugee settlement patterns makes Jordan an excellent example to examine 
impacts of settlement and assimilation policies for forced migrants from an 
interdisciplinary perspective.  
This study contributes to an understanding of the relationship between history, 
policy and outcomes for refugee integration and success. Necessary policy and 
institutional reform is required for Syrian refugees to gain access to segregated 
ethnic/refugee communities to create social mobility ladders to foster successful spatial 
integration and labor market incorporation. I argue this throughout the paper by first 
providing an overview of the growing literature on forced migration studies, 
assimilation/integration theory, and policy path dependency. I then outline the 
methodology, as broken down into three main sections: (1) historical/institutional 
context, (2) policy analysis, and (3) outcomes analysis. The first section is based in 
political science, adding to the path dependency literature. The second section is more 
interdisciplinary, combing political science policy analysis methodology with a 
sociological concept of integration. The last section is sociological, contributing a 
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sociological understanding of community integration for refugees. I conclude the paper 
by offering a broader perspective on housing justice, and global reform for a proactive 
prevention of refugee crises as opposed to (necessary) reactive humanitarianism.  
Perspectives on Forced Migration and Refugee Integration 
Prior to the 2009 policy change, much of the forced migration literature examined 
camps and the role they played in providing relief to refugees. The policy shift did not 
end research on camps, but allowed for easier access to data on self-settled refugees due 
to official UNHCR recognition. The debates on encampment have existed for nearly as 
long as the international community has utilized it as a solution to refugee crises 
(Chambers 1979; Van Damme 1995; Agier 2002; Hoffmann 2017). Although there is a 
near consensus that encampment is problematic since it is a short-term solution to a 
permanent or long-term problem, it continues to be a focus in policies and research 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:127).  
 Some more recent arguments have added nuance to encampment criticisms. Van 
Damme (1995) looks to the successful use of camps in Bangladesh in 1971, but argues 
encampment worked here because the problem was temporary. As examined in a 
previous section, temporary has become the exception in refugee situations that continue 
to go on for longer periods of time. In addition, according to Jacobsen (2001:7), 
governments and relief agencies tend to prefer camps because it makes “management of 
assistance easier” and allows for easier transition to repatriation: one of the durable 
solutions promoted by the UNHCR. She also argues that the context of the refugee 
situation in relation to the host community may sometimes call for encampment policies 
(Jacobsen 2001:10). In cases where camps occur or are necessary, participation in camp 
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planning by the target population can help promote self-sufficiency within the camp 
population (Stevenson & Sutton 2012; Bulley 2014). While these add nuance to anti-
camp literature, the harsh critiques on UNHCR’s focus on camps and disregard for self-
settled refugees led to their 2009 policy change, and the 2014 addition that the 
organization will avoid encampment whenever possible.  
Instead, sociologists, political scientists, and forced migration experts alike have 
begun to focus on other solutions for refugee crises that take a longer-term perspective 
(Jacobsen 2001; Phillimore & Goodson 2005; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014). The 
UNHCR asserts three pillars of durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, resettlement, 
and local integration (UNHCR). Due to humanitarianism’s nature as defined by “the 
treatment of symptoms and not causes of suffering, and by standing clear of politics”, 
voluntary repatriation is often unrealizable by UNHCR efforts unless the conflict 
miraculously ends. Resettlement is barely more attainable as, according to the UNHCR, 
less than one percent of refugees are submitted for resettlement (UNHCR: Solutions).  
As a result, researchers and NGOs see integration as the most attainable ‘durable 
solution’, yet Jacobsen (2001) noted it as a ‘forgotten solution’. Hovil (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
et al. 2014) argues that it is not forgotten, but in fact evaded by national and international 
actors. Integration efforts and their subsequent successes and failures are highly based on 
the socio-political context of the protracted refugee situation. This solution also goes 
further than simply integrating refugees physically into the host community, or by 
providing citizenship. While both greatly facilitate and often allow for integration, they 
alone “[do] not necessarily translate into inclusion for former refugees” (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:489). Ager and Strang (2004:5) describe a group as integrated when 
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they have public outcomes similar to the host community, are socially connected with the 
host community and its state functions, as well as having sufficient cultural knowledge 
and shared notions of citizenship. This is facilitated when the refugee population has 
similar social and cultural structures to the host community (Phillimore & Goodson 
2005:1722).  
Citizenship—and host countries’ withholding of this privilege—can often act as a 
substantial barrier to de facto integration, as is the case of Gazan refugees in Jordan 
compared to their West Bank counterparts although Perez (2011:1041) asserts that by 
demanding citizenship, Gazans “are tacitly accepting the idea that rights are the exclusive 
privilege of citizens.” Others have argued, “those with formal legal status do not seem to 
do much better than those without legal status” (Jacobsen 2006:282). While debates 
continue on the relevance of citizenship in relation to integration, many agree that 
successful integration relies on a host community that is open to the forced migrant 
population (Jacobsen 2001; Jacobsen 2006; Phillimore & Goodson 2006; Valenta & 
Bunar 2010; Gibson 2015; Kattaa 2016b). 
Enacting policy change can also pose a challenge for several countries with 
existing refugee populations. Many political scientists study the processes for creating 
and implementing policies, analyzing this in cases of policies over time and the ability of 
institutions to reverse policies or take other policy paths. An analytical framework to 
understand these processes is path dependency. Path dependency is an analytical term 
aimed at understanding policies over extended, and substantial stretches of time. 
According to Margaret Levi (1997), path dependency means, “that once a country or 
region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high” (p. 28). For a country 
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such as Jordan, which has had refugees since 1947, this temporally long policy regime 
can be worrisome for refugees finding a home their today.  
Additionally, Pierson argues, “Politics is based on authority rather than exchange. 
Thus in politics, institutional constraints are ubiquitous” (2004:34). Interestingly, the 
process of creating new policies “is, in the nature of things, to displace institutions, norms 
or routines that exist”—just as Syrian refugees were displaced from their homes (Orren & 
Skowronek 2014:5). As a result, the forcibly displaced often find themselves in a 
situation of ‘sticky’ policy displacement due to the long history of policies and their 
institutional disadvantages. Steinmo and Watts argue the “institutional context explains 
(and could be used to predict) future policy failures and successes (1995:330). In the 
context of refugee policies, one can examine the institutional context of refugees versus 
host community nationals, to understand and predict future policies regarding the forcibly 
displaced.   
Integration 
Others, predominantly (but not exclusively) sociologists, have looked at 
complexities within integration efforts. Soh et al. (2016) differentiate integration from 
assimilation, separation, and marginalization. The most important distinction is between 
integration: “when [refugees] keep both home and host identities while still interacting 
with the host community”; and marginalization: “when [refugees] neither have home nor 
host identity” (Soh et al. 2016:6). Lack of de jure integration (such as citizenship) and 
lack of refugee concentrations (urban enclaves/ghettos) can lead to loss of concrete 
identity from host or home and results in marginalization.  
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Literature on immigrant communities often examines how differing levels of 
social segregation shape social life. Due to “the initial disadvantages associated with 
immigrant status…they [immigrants/refugees] usually form their own ethnic enclaves” as 
a response to “obstacles in crossing the threshold to the large society” (Min Zhou 1992: 
2; Abrahamson 2006:131). The concept of social segregation in the form of an enclave as 
a means of protection and self-promotion is consistent in literature on the subject 
(Abrahamson 2006; Yee 1996; Wacquant 2012; Portes & Zhou 1993). This often follows 
an understanding of the oppressive outcomes that also result from these ethnically 
segregated neighborhoods and ghettos. Loïc Wacquant outlines four cornerstones of these 
outcomes: Stigma, Constraint, Spatial confinement and Institutional parallelism (2012:7). 
Additionally, segregated communities hinder integration with the host society due to a 
lack of contact between groups. According to Meier, “More diverse neighborhoods and 
more encounters with difference lead to more intergroup relations and lower prejudice” 
(2017:253). The formation of segregated ethnic enclaves can lead to social mobility 
within the community, but prejudice from without.  
The successful integration of these communities is often predicated on the 
housing rights they have access to. For example, in Istanbul, the law dictates that 
squatters cannot be evicted from their homes if it is sound construction with the resident 
already moved in. This unique law can provide poorer communities with a chance to 
thrive, and one particular woman stated that, “without squatting she would either be 
homeless or hungry” (Neuwirth 2006:150). Many assimilation theorists describe ethnic 
enclaves as a pivotal stepping-stone for labor market incorporation, but these are not 
uncritically understood as a pathway to integration (Min Zhou 1992:15). Integration 
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theory, on the other hand, explicitly includes structural methods to incorporate migrants 
into labor markets (Schneider & Crul 2010:1144). Interestingly, Wessel et al. (2017) 
argue labor market participation is the main driver of upward spatial mobility and 
integration into the larger society (p. 834).  
Logically following these theoretical claims, the following syllogism must be 
true: If ethnic enclaves beget economic integration, and economic integration begets 
spatial integration, then segregated ethnic (or refugee) enclaves beget overall integration 
into host communities. As Desmond (2016) explains, these are all possible only in cases 
of residential and community stability, which can be difficult for poor families “because 
they are evicted at such high rates. That low-income families move often is well 
known”—a fact researchers have overlooked in regards to policy impacts (p. 296). 
Refugee communities reflect many of the issues faced by these immigrant communities, 
but have some distinct characteristics as well. Without the mobility ladders offered by 
these ethnically homogenous communities, refugees, immigrants, and other new arrivals 
face a high chance of downward assimilation.  
Patterns of Settlement 
According to the Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies, 
“social integration has been a central theme in sociology” and they call for the sociology 
of evictions “to be an expanding issue within studies of forced migration” (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:90 & 95). Stephen Castles (2003) calls on sociologists to examine 
social policy and human agency in refugee settlement through an interdisciplinary and 
historical lens. Additionally, Jacobsen (2006) calls for the need “to address the specific 
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vulnerability of refugees, [and] the resources and strategies they employ to reduce this 
vulnerability, and the impact of these changes on the host society” (p. 279). 
Among research on urban or self-settled refugees, there remains “a 
disproportionate focus of research on formal camps” even though it is well understood 
that the majority of refugees, globally, reside in self-settled areas (Bakewell 2008:433). 
The majority of self-settled refugee literature examines the labor market within different 
regional contexts (Jacobsen 2001:15; Phillimore & Goodson 2006; Young & Jacobsen 
2013; Kattaa 2016a; Kattaa 2016b) With the literature that does exist on self-settled 
refugees, there lacks research on the impacts of different policy strategies for refugees 
and host communities (Polzer 2008:476; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:94; Huang et al. 
2017:29). The dearth of integration research is often limited by region as well with a 
large focus on Africa and industrialized western countries, while “the Middle East 
remains largely under-examined” (Kattaa 2016a:8). There remains a clear but shrinking 
gap on integration policies in the Middle East in forced migration literature.  
Local integration is often regarded as an attainable durable solution for refugees, 
but it does have its limits. Jacobsen (2001) alleges that there are contextual and political 
restraints to integration. She states, “where local integration aggravates existing security 
problems, or adds to the economic and social problems and instabilities in the RHA, it is 
neither fair nor feasible to expect that integration be pursued” (p. 24). Her argument is 
important to note, but over emphasizes the negative impacts of refugees and misses the 
economic opportunities they can bring. Although, that is not to diminish her argument 
that self-settled refugees can cause increased demand for housing, leading to price 
increases, and “poorer local people may be forced out” as well as other refugees 
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(Jacobsen 2001:17). These housing issues are a reflection of the “forms of niche-
gentrification” that Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah (2012:152) examined in their analysis 
on the effects of refugees and conflict on city growth in Nyala, Darfur. These authors 
utilize the term niche gentrification to describe a unique, homogenous group experiencing 
gentrification as a group. The niche gentrification refugees face adds to the need for an 
expansion in the study of the sociology of evictions in forced migration literature 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:94).  
Furthermore, allowing for refugees to self-settle—while often cheaper than 
encampment—can work against attempts by the host government “to secure financial 
aid” due to a lack of visibility of urban refugees (Turner 2015:393). Protracted Refugee 
Situations often require large amounts of donor money, and host governments are less 
likely to accept integration policies if it decreases international funds. Moreover, a widely 
noted problem with integration lies in this invisibility, which makes it more difficult for 
aid agencies to provide necessary services to self-settled refugees (Ward 2014; Hoffmann 
2017; Huang et al. 2017). Scholars continue to regard integration as an excellent solution 
while understanding its limitations.  
This research works to fill the current gaps in forced migration literature on the 
importance of housing and settlement patterns to integration by combining sociological 
understandings of urban social life and a political science policy analysis. In addition it 
fills the missing literature on the Middle East region’s disproportionate refugee 
population. By focusing on settlement vulnerabilities—in relation to its ability to amplify 
or diminish the agency of the target population in Jordan, this project assesses the impact 
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of various policies on refugees and their host communities and thereby shed more light 
on questions of labor, housing and integration of forced migrants in Jordan.  
Methodology  
 Using Jordan as a case study, I conduct a policy analysis as well as a subsequent 
outcomes analysis to understand the extent of refugee integration within Jordan. To 
understand the analysis, a grasp of what refugee integration means is paramount. Refugee 
integration refers to the process of “legal, economic, social and cultural incorporation of 
refugees, culminating in the offer of citizenship” (Jacobsen 2001:1). The analysis utilizes 
this definition to determine if the policies and outcomes in Jordan have fostered 
successful integration or hampered Syrian refugees access to successful, integrated 
livelihoods. 
In this study, the analysis investigates the impacts of Jordan’s refugee housing 
and labor policies as applied toward the current Syrian refugee population in regards to 
integration. Ager and Strang (2004) created an ‘Indicators of Integration’ framework for 
assessing integration policies. The authors encourage the flexible use of the framework in 
regions outside the original use (2004:2). The framework consists of ten domains, under 
four headings. ‘Means and Markers’ contains employment, housing, education and 
health. ‘Social Connections’ contains social bridges, bonds, and links within and out the 
different communities and structures. ‘Facilitators’ contains cultural knowledge and 
security/safety. Finally, ‘Foundation’ refers to the rights and citizenship aspect of 
integration (2004:3).  
 I utilize this framework similarly to Velenta & Bunar’s (2010) State Assisted 
Integration paper in which they analyze the integration of refugees in Norway and 
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Sweden, and pay closer attention to the housing and economic ‘Means and Markers’; 
however, due to the path dependency of these policies, instead of comparing two separate 
countries’ policies I analyze the current policy regime within the historical context of 
Jordan and the UNHCR’s history of refugees. I focus mainly on the policies and 
outcomes targeted at the more recent Syrian refugee population within Jordan. I give 
special attention to the housing domain to provide a deeper understanding of ‘niche 
gentrification’ and the sociology of housing within refugee/host community relations. 
This portion of the analysis will draw from Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah’s (2012) City 
Growth Under Conflict Conditions in which they utilize rental data to understand the 
impact of a refugee crisis on urban growth. This furthers the reflections on structure and 
agency by providing a look at what options—or lack thereof—refugees face in regards to 
housing, and how policies shape those opportunities. 
 First I provide a historical and institutional context of Jordan’s refugee policy 
regime through a lens of path dependency to understand the reasoning behind Jordan’s 
current policies, as well as predictions for reform in similar fashion to Steinmo & Watts’ 
(1995) analysis of failed health care reform in the United States. Next, I investigate the 
core principles of the refugee policies in relation to integration. To do so, I utilize the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) excel tool to analyze the level Jordan’s 
policies promote, or hurt integration of its refugee population within the two ‘policy 
areas’ of economics and housing. Originally designed for immigrant integration 
assessment into European and western countries, I edited some of the wording of the 
MIPEX tool to closer fit refugees in Jordan. In cases where no mention of the score 
requirement was found, this resulted in a score of 0.  
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I turn my attention to outcomes of integration into the labor market. To analyze 
this, I look for “significant differences between immigrants and the native population in 
aspects of everyday life—from labor market participation and income” to how refugees 
are “represented in low-income/low-status occupations” in relation to the host community 
(Valenta & Bunar 2010:470-1). I then conduct an in-depth analysis of housing/settlement 
outcomes through “collected information on changes to the housing sector from urban 
planning agencies and rental agents” allowing for a rigorous understanding of “the forms 
of social dislocation within the city” with data from the Jordan Department of Statistics 
and the REACH organization in Jordan (Bartlett, Alix-Garcia & Saah 2012:153). 
Similarly to the labor market analysis, I compare rental data between Jordanian nationals 
and the refugees in their host communities. I continue this analysis by running 
regressions between average rents and different variables such as households and 
population to understand specific causations of disparities in rent. Finally, I utilize data 
on security of tenure for host community refugees compared to Jordanians, as well as the 
previous findings to address their access to community building and effects of evictions.  
 I compiled a variety of data sources, and juxtaposed these data against select 
policies relevant to conduct the analysis. UNHCR distributed maps, among other NGO-
provided resources, along with census data provided by Jordan’s Department of Statistics 
(JDOS), allows for the housing and settlement analysis to understand if Syrian refugees 
have been successfully building and joining communities. While Jordan’s census data 
gather information on refugees, it is not their primary focus. Due to gaps in this data, I 
utilize numerous reports from the UNHCR, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 
International Labour Organization (ILO), Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), 
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and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to fill in refugee specific gaps to analyze 
integration, specifically economic/labor integration. 
 While the methodology aims to do a lot, it is necessary for a complete and 
coherent analysis of the integration of refugees within Jordan. These different pieces 
contribute toward each other, as each one influences the other. This analysis is possible 
due to the extensive pre-existing data, which is collected on refugee circumstances in 
association with the distribution of aid services. This analysis brings a deeper 
understanding of effective integration policies in regards to housing and labor in middle-
income countries to promote the livelihoods of forced migrants.   
Historical Context 
UNHCR Policy Overview 
The overemphasis on camp refugees has not simply been a result of media 
portrayal. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ was founded in 1950 as 
a response to the refugee crisis from World War II. Its goal was to help the millions of 
displaced Europeans, but has since expanded its mission to its current goal to aid the 
world’s forcibly displaced. Although that was its mission, it has largely ignored a major 
component to refugee issues. Official UNHCR policy did not—until 2009—address 
urban, and self-settled refugees. Instead, the UNHCR solely utilized encampment to 
address refugees. For example, in 2005, only 25% of the world’s refugees lived in camps 
yet only 3 years earlier “officially designated camps [were] reported to contain altogether 
87.6 percent of the refugees assisted by the UNHCR” (Dorai 2007:3; Agier 2002:320). 
Specifically in the Middle East, a region in the Global South host to a large portion of the 
world’s displaced persons had (in 2005) 60% of its refugees residing in urban areas, 
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“representing a 35 percent increase since 1950” (Ward 2014:81). The global trend in 
urbanization makes it “unsurprising that the displaced follow suit” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et 
al. 2014:139).  
Since its founding, the UNHCR had not specifically addressed urban refugees 
until it created the UNHCR Comprehensive Policy on Urban Refugees in 1997. The 
concept of aid as a pull factor into cities, and urban refugees as a detriment to host 
communities informed this largely criticized policy (Ward 2014:79). Instead, the 
humanitarian organization used encampment as its main solution to large displacement 
into countries in the Global South.  In 2009, after receiving severe criticisms for its policy 
stance regarding urban refugees, the new Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in 
Urban Areas states that the UNHCR will provide assistance to refugees in urban areas 
with or without the authorities approval of their residence there (Turner 2015:389). This 
policy represents the beginning of a shift regarding forced migration away from “the 
establishment of camps, wherever possible” and towards more durable solutions such as 
local integration (UNHCR 2014:6). UNHCR policy had a long history of ignoring urban 
refugees, and the extended period of this policy made it all the more costly to implement 
a policy reversal, according to path dependency theory. Although the UNHCR’s policies 
have shifted, it is only one actor within the international refugee regime; the organization 
faces an uphill battle against host states that are reluctant to formally accept forced 
migrants into host communities and urban areas.  
This fact remains as many host countries “turn a blind eye—both to the work and 
the exploitation that goes with it—because refugees provide cheap labour” (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:106) or because they lack the capacity to extract all the self-settled 
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refugees living outside camps (Jacobsen 2001:3). This legal invisibility opens up refugee 
populations to negative outcomes, which can then negatively impact the host community. 
According to the UNHCR’s most recent figures, there are over 60 million displaced 
persons, and over 20 million refugees worldwide. As fewer than 200,000 of those have 
been resettled, efforts must be focused on creating durable solutions and policies for the 
majority of the forced migrant population.  
Refugee History Within Jordan 
 Jordan has played a pivotal role in hosting a large share of the world’s forcibly 
displaced. Since 1949, when the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
was formed to provide relief to Palestinian refugees fleeing Israeli occupation, Jordan has 
been home to millions of forced migrants. According to the UNRWA, there were over 
two million registered Palestinian refugees in 2016, some living in 10 camps, and around 
two-thirds living in urban areas. Up until the 1970s, the Hashemite Kingdom—(the ruling 
monarchical dynasty over Jordan) was committed to a policy of integration: the kingdom 
provided citizenship rights to millions of Palestinian refugees, resulting in about 40% of 
UNRWA-registered refugees obtaining equal rights as Jordanian nationals (Soh, You, & 
Yu 2016:2). Many of the camps that were created were near or within existing, dense 
urban areas that have over time become integrated neighborhoods (Chatelard 2002:2). 
While proximity worked in favor for Palestinian-Jordanians, “being housed close to 
urban areas doesn’t always result in refugees effectively being absorbed into the local 
population” (Finch 2015:55). While encampment policies have been widely critiqued, the 
combination with some of the integrationist policies of both Jordan and the UNRWA 
allowed for improved outcomes for Palestinian-Jordanian citizens.  
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Although it is important to note that the generosity dealt out by the Hashemite 
Kingdom at this time was regarded as “an opportunity for the ambitious King Abdullah 
of Jordan to fulfill his expansionist goals” (Achilli 2014:236). In addition, the granting of 
citizenship rights was not equally distributed for all Palestinian refugees fleeing to the 
Kingdom. According to Perez (2011:1031), “at least 120,000 refugees from Gaza Strip 
have been denied this privilege for over 40 years”, leaving them disadvantaged compared 
to their West Bank brothers and sisters.  
The growth of nationalism and militancy among Palestinian refugees led to the 
civil war in Jordan known as “Black September”, causing the Kingdom in 1988 to revert 
its relationship with Palestinian refugees and the West Bank, depriving them of 
citizenship (Achilli 2014:239). Since then, any Palestinian refugees attempting to find 
asylum within Jordan risk remaining stateless inside the kingdom or worse, refoulement. 
Refoulement is defined in the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees:  
"No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion." 
 In addition, the UNRWA historically provided basic services to any Palestinian refugees 
in Jordan as opposed to the UNHCR, but due to budgetary issues it has reduced social 
services since 1997 (Chatelard 2002:2). As Jordan’s policies have slowly reverted against 
refugees, these policies have created a path dependency in opposition to the rights that 
were once afforded to the West Bank Palestinian refugees. As the temporal distribution of 
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these policies goes on longer, the ability to reverse the trend becomes more cumbersome 
and near politically impossible. 
Recent Refugees 
Due to instability across the region from internal and external actors, flows of 
refugees have formed and crossed into the Kingdom steadily since the Palestinian 
refugees first did in 1948. For example, the Gulf War set an initial wave of Iraqi refugees 
into Jordan in the ‘90s. In the 2000s, the U.S. led invasion into this Arab nation set off an 
even larger forced migrant population to flee across the region into Syria, Lebanon, Iran, 
and around 450,000-500,000 to Jordan (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:592). Unlike the 
response to Palestinian refugees, Iraqis were not subject to large encampment policies 
(Turner 2015:387). The Iraqi refugees continued, albeit slower, to enter the Kingdom as 
the Syrian Civil War forced around five million people to flee the country beginning in 
2011.  
Jordan was among the neighboring countries to receive a large portion of the 
refugees from the ongoing crisis in Syria. The UNHCR has over 650,000 registered 
Syrian refugees in Jordan but unofficial estimates place the number around one million 
refugees residing in the Kingdom (Briggs 2015:10). The Jordanian government initially 
set up a camp to house the Syrian refugees in a small temporary tent community, which 
grew to be the 4th largest city in the country and is now known as the al-Zaatari camp (Ott 
2015). Around 100,000 of the registered Syrians live in official UNHCR run camps 
(mainly al-Zaatari & Azraq camps), with 80,000 in the al-Zaatari camp alone.  
All of these refugee crises within Jordan have developed—or are currently 
developing—into protracted refugee situations. The nature of conflict over time has 
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transformed the nature of refugees’ realities into more permanent situations, although 
expectations have not always aligned with reality. The UNHCR has utilized several 
definitions for protracted situations, but the current one, accepted by the Jordanian 
government defines it as refugees whom have been in exile “for five or more years after 
their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable 
solutions” (UNHCR 2009:preamble). The UNRWA oversees one of the largest PRS’ in 
the world with over four million Palestinians, and the Syrian refugees appear to be 
quickly heading toward a protracted situation, with few prospects for ending the conflict, 
as policies and funding structures remain short-term.  
Jordan’s Policies 
While the UNHCR and UNRWA—among countless other NGOs—have played 
significant third party roles within the refugee situations in Jordan, the Hashemite 
Kingdom still plays a dominant role in deciding the outcomes for refugees within their 
borders. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention, signed by over 140 states, and the 
subsequent 1967 Protocol, outlined and defined the legal rights of refugees and the 
requirements for their protection. Jordan was one of several Middle Eastern states to not 
sign either document; however, the Kingdom did sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) in 1998, which reasserted some of the definitions in the Convention, but most 
importantly agreed to the principle of non-refoulement of refugees (MOU 
1998:Translation). While the MOU has been regarded as a step forward for having a 
concrete document directed at refugee policy, it has been considered “somewhat 
ambiguous within policy frameworks” and not in line with handling protracted refugee 
situations due to its identification of Jordan as a ‘transit’ country (Ward 2014:81). The 
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Government of Jordan’s position towards refugees greatly varies as time progresses, from 
seeing Palestinian refugees as a benefit to society, to semi-protectionist policies for Iraqis 
(Chatelard 2002:8) and encampment for Syrians.  
These policies over time have created institutional rifts between Jordanian 
nationals and refugees and refugee-citizens. According to Clark (2012), “successive 
monarchs have provided subsidies to Jordanian tribes and preferentially recruited them 
into various parts of the state apparatus” creating a Jordanian tribal elite (p. 360). The 
Palestinians have filled the private sector as a result of their exclusion from the tribal 
politics of Jordanian public administration. Refugees more generally are institutionally 
disenfranchised from participating in this style of democratic governance, leading to 
increased inability to promote and implement successful refugee policy reform.  
Furthermore, Jordanian municipalities have undergone centralization of many of 
their services by the state, leading to decreased budgetary authority (Clark 2012:362) as 
well as the rate of public sector hiring to drop “precipitously since the mid to late 1980s 
(Assaad 2012:12). With Jordanian nationals losing work in the public sector as 
Palestinians, foreigners and other refugees work in the public (and largely informal) 
sector, tensions have risen between the two groups; retired army officers publicly 
demanded the renunciation of citizenship for Palestinians (Ryan 2010). The institutional 
context of Jordanian nationals tribal politics and its exclusion of non-Jordanians provides 
insight into Jordan’s refugee policy and the difficulty in reform. 
Jordan Compact 
Most recently, there have been shifts in Jordan’s official political stance towards 
refugees, a potential outcome of foreign influence. In February of 2016, the UK, 
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Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations cohosted the London Conference to 
find solutions and funding for the ongoing, international Syrian crisis. One of the 
outcomes of this fairly successful conference was the Jordan Compact. The Compact is 
an agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom and the international community 
(including the UNHCR) to create around 200,000 jobs for Syrians in exchange for 
increased international support of Jordan’s economy (3RP 2016:46). This represents a 
slight policy reversal, which according to path dependency theory would normally be 
high cost for Jordan with its longer history regarding policies towards refugees; however, 
the international community has shouldered the cost, allowing for the policy reversal. 
This falls in line with Jordan’s past of promoting refugees in their borders when it 
appears to benefit them economically or politically.  
The Compact attempts to turn the “crisis into a development opportunity…rebuild 
Jordanian host communities…[and] mobilize sufficient grants and concessionary 
financing” (Jordan Compact 2016:1). The compact provided real funding, as well as 
specific solutions to some of Syrian refugees’ largest hurdles to success in Jordan. The 
most profound outcomes of the Compact include the designation of five development 
zones for increased Syrian participation, decreased requirements for work permits, and 
simplified rules of origin to open up the EU market to business in Jordan (3RP 2016:47). 
These changes to Jordan’s policies are a much-needed reprieve for Syrian refugees 
struggling to find work, or work legally. 
The Compact does have flaws, and does not truly address the roots of Jordan’s 
refugee crisis. First and foremost, these changes do not affect the institutional rights of 
refugees in Jordan, only offering a temporary economic solution to a problem that will 
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most likely last generations. Second, attaining a work permit still requires the employer 
to represent the worker, as well as pay a 10 JOD verification fee, but the more expensive 
work permit fee (180-350 JOD) was removed (ILO 2017:23). Leaving the onus to the 
employer to represent the worker has been detrimental to Syrian refugees gaining access 
to work permits due to a “dearth of employers willing and able to process the paperwork” 
(Kattaa 2016b:76). Additionally, Jordan has a “large number of low-quality informal jobs 
in construction and services that are mostly being filled by a growing legion of foreign 
workers” (Assaad 2012:3). Making permits more accessible may not actually provide 
more work opportunities for Syrian refugees due to Jordan’s large informal labor market; 
instead, it may act more as a symbolic gesture to this especially marginalized group of 
refugees in Jordan.  
Other than the Memorandum of Understanding, and the recent Jordan Compact, 
the Hashemite Kingdom does not have refugee-specific directives; instead it has referred 
to more recent refugees as ‘guests’ and ‘visitors’: names that have “no legal meaning 
under domestic laws” (Kattaa 2016a:6). The lack of concrete refugee law has left 
refugees in Jordan under many of the same laws and policies that any other foreign 
migrant would face. In regards to labor laws, refugees fall under the category of non-
Jordanians and must go through the arduous permit process to work in the formal sector. 
The policy improvements made by the Jordan government should be understood through 
the lens of their historical path with refugees: the Hashemite Kingdom promotes refugees 
while it is convenient, but over time slowly takes these rights away as it loses its appeal.  
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Policy Assessment 
 Jordan holds a unique position in the world as the country with the highest ratio of 
refugees to host population (ILO 2015:9). While the Syrian crisis has only added to the 
refugee population, Jordan continues to lack significant policies targeted towards 
refugees. The sole document that mentions refugee specific policy is the 1998 
Memorandum of Understanding, which addresses important issues such as Jordan’s 
official acceptance of non-refoulement for all refugees; however, it officially designates 
Jordan a transit-country in regards to refugee resettlement, meaning all refugees are 
regarded as temporary guests. This designation, along with an outright lack of refugee 
specific policies, means refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan are grouped in with all 
other immigrants who live and work in the Kingdom. While both groups represent a 
piece of the migrant community, forced migrants face specific challenges such as trauma, 
moving with little to no funds, and health issues. This leaves them especially vulnerable 
in a country that makes little distinction between the two. This section analytically 
addresses the policies themselves, and not the outcomes; moreover, it provides a context 
for the outcomes to be understood in later sections. This paper does not analyze overall 
refugee integration into Jordanian society, but simply on the policy areas of Labor and 
Housing.  
The MIPEX tool provides a score out of 100 on each of the indicators. The 
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Table 1: MIPEX Score Breakdown 
Score Rating 
80-100 Favorable 
60-79 Slightly Favorable 
41-59 Halfway Favorable 
21-40 Slightly Unfavorable 
1-20 Unfavorable 
0 Critically Unfavorable 
Source: MIPEX (http://www.mipex.eu/play/) 
Each policy area (housing and labor) breaks down into several categories to develop the 
overall score of integration. For Labor, I chose to omit the two categories on ‘Support’ as 
I saw these as European Union specific and unable to conform to a refugee situation in a 
middle-income country—unfairly deflating the score. For housing, I chose to omit the 
‘Naturalization’ and ‘Language’ categories as they were completely inapplicable to 
Jordan’s policies and would have had no impact on scoring. See the Appendices for 
further information on how I score each policy area. 
Labor/Employment Policy 
 The Migrant Integration Policy Index, intended for an assessment of migrant 
integration in EU countries, allows for an overall score of each countries policy’s impacts 
on immigrant integration. Instead of utilizing the entire index for a holistic view of 
Jordan’s integration of refugees, I focus specifically on labor/employment, and housing 
policies. The core policies that address employment for refugees are the 1973 Residence 
and Foreign Affairs Law No. 24, the Investment Law no. (16) of 1995, and the Labor 
Law no. (8) of 1996. As previously stated, these laws either make no, or very brief 
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mention of refugees and asylum seekers, mistakenly conflating two similar yet distinct 
groups (refugees and immigrants).  
 The MIPEX breaks down the Labor and employment policy assessment section 
down into two categories: Access to labor market mobility, and Workers’ Rights. 
Jordan’s employment policies’ for refugees receive and overall score of about 55 (out of 
100) on the integration index, giving it a halfway favorable assessment according to the 
MIPEX scoring breakdown. At face value, this shows that Jordan’s policies toward 
refugees (and migrants in general) do not do a significant job at promoting integration 
into the labor market, but does not harm integration. Breaking it down, Access receives a 
lower score of 40, while Workers’ Rights receives a potentially inflated score of 75. The 
Access score is low due to restrictions against foreigners obtaining work permits in 
certain professions, as well as the lack of self-employment for foreigners and refugees 
(Jordan 1996: Labor Law no. 8 Article 12). These restrictions are coupled with the 
complex, and expensive work permit process, which only lasts one year for foreign 
workers. I argue that the Workers’ Rights indicator is inflated at 75/100 due to the 
realities of work for refugees in Jordan, potentially a result of the restrictive Access 
indicator, as well as a limit on the MIPEX assessment.  
Housing Policy 
 The Migrant Integration Policy Index breaks down the Housing indicator—
slightly more than the labor indicator—into: Eligibility, Security of Status, and Rights. 
The scores are provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Housing Indicator Score Breakdown 
Indicator Score 
Eligibility 25 
Security of Status 14 
Rights Associated 50 
Overall 23 
 
The overall integration index score for housing policy at 23 is significantly lower than 
that of the already low labor policy of 55. A score of 23 puts Jordan’s housing policies at 
the lower end of ‘slightly unfavorable’ according to the MIPEX scoring breakdown. This 
unfavorable score comes from the overall restrictive policy towards foreign residency in 
Jordan, as compared to the Index’s targeted European Union countries. The majority of 
the policy that addresses residency for refugees in Jordan is No. 24 Law on Residence 
and Foreigners’ Affairs.  
The largest factor in Jordan’s low score here is the lack of a legitimate long-term, 
or permanent, residency permit. The typical residence permit (10 JOD) only lasts one 
year, and must be renewed if the migrant moves to a new address. The longest-term 
permit is a five-year residency permit, but this is only offered after the migrant has lived 
within the Kingdom for 10 years (Jordan 1973: Law no. 24 Article 22b). The security of 
this status received the lowest score of 14, mostly due to a lack of a facilitated process for 
permit renewals compared to the original permit request. In other words, every year, or 
every time a refugee moves, they must pay the fee as well as provide all of the original 
documents required for a permit. Such restrictive policies can lead to its intended 
population finding housing illegally, leading to higher risk of exploitation by landlords. 
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Rights associated with residency status received the highest score of 50, but I 
argue this is another inflated score. The Overseas Development Institute produced a 
report mapping out which groups have access to services and assistance in Jordan. While 
refugees are not barred from most governmental assistance in regards to public housing, 
or rent control, they are not the targeted group, and most of the assistance they receive 
comes from NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (2017:19). The dissonance 
between policy and implementation of assistance actually harms integration due to the 
formation of parallel institutions, even though the analysis shows it has a moderate score 
of 50 (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2016:146). See appendix for further breakdown of each 
indicator and the scoring.  
Outcomes 
 Policy analysis is vital to understanding the legal and institutional opportunities 
refugees are afforded, but it does not provide a complete understanding of their 
circumstances. With negligible reference to refugees in official policy, the outcomes can 
potentially enhance the analysis of refugee experiences within a country home to a 
myriad of displaced persons. The following outcome analysis mirrors the policy 
analysis—focusing on the two policy areas of employment/labor and housing/settlement 
patterns.  
Employment Outcomes 
 The policies regarding the integration of refugees into the labor market in Jordan 
received low to moderate scoring, but how does this translate into integration outcomes 
for Syrian refugees? Do the policies actually have a profound affect on integration? To 
find these answers, we examine some employment statistics, juxtaposing Jordan’s host 
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communities and the refugees living within them. Table 3 outlines the 2015 
unemployment rate for both groups (including Syria’s pre-conflict rate to ensure this was 
not an intervening variable). The year of 2015 was when the best comparable data was 
available, but still allows for several years since the conflict to allow refugees time to 
settle down and look for work.  
 
Table 3: Unemployment by Gender and Group (2015) 
Unemployment Women Men Total 
Host Community1 23% 11% 13% 
Syrian Refugees2 88% 57% 65% 
Pre-Conflict Syria2 27% 17% n/a 
1Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/) 
2Source: International Labor Organization (Staeve & Hillesund 2015:5) 
 
The large difference (61 and 40 percentage points for women and men respectively) 
between pre-conflict unemployment in Syria and Syrian refugees’ unemployment in 
Jordan reveals that the country of origin is not impacting their current high 
unemployment. Additionally, Jordan’s overall unemployment for the year of 2015 is 
much lower (by 65 and 46 percentage points for women and men respectively) than that 
of Syrian refugees years into their settlement. Such a large divide indicates that Syrians 
experience trouble with integration into the employment sector simply by the inability of 
finding work. This reflects the finding that Jordan’s employment policies affecting 
refugees do little to promote integration.  
 Syrian refugees ability to find work at significantly lower levels than host 
communities gives insight into overall integration for employment; but for those that 
have found work, what does that look like and how does it compare to Jordanians? First 
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we look at the informality of labor for both groups. As discussed previously, Jordan has a 
large segment of the population working informally; therefore, it is vital to understand the 
role Syrian refugees play in Jordan’s informal market to understand the integration into 
the overall labor sector. Table 4 breaks down informal labor employment.  
 
Table 4: Informal Employment by Gender and Group 
% Employed Informally Women Men Total 
Host Community1 40% 53% 50% 
Refugees2 92% 99% 99% 
1Source: Jordan Department of Statistics: (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/) 
2Source: International Labour Organization (Staeve & Hillesund 2015: 63) 
 
The percentages confirm that Jordan’s labor market has a significant informal market, 
with about 50% working informally. The Syrian refugees have largely fulfilled this niche 
market, with 99% of Syrians working informally. While both groups have large segments 
in the informal labor market, the Syrian refugees clearly have been pushed to work 
informally as opposed to pursuing a legal path.  
 Syrian refugees have largely filled the informal sector, but to truly understand 
their integration into employment, one must understand the roles they have filled by 
sector of work. The following table utilizes data on work permits issued to Syrian 
refugees as an indicator for their work sector breakdown and compares it to data on 
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Table 5: Crosstabs—Employment Sector by Refugee Issued Permits vs. Jordanians 
actual sector work (2015) 
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1Source: International Labour Organization: Right to Work 
2Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/) 
 
To test if there is a relationship between these variables, I conducted a chi-square 
test of independence. In this case, the null hypothesis that there is no association between 
the variables refers to an integrated work force. With a calculated chi-square value of 
28920.20 and 5 degrees of freedom, we can conclude that the relationship between 
refugee status and work sector is significant at the .001 level; therefore, we can reject the 
null hypothesis, indicating Syrian refugees have not been able to integrate into Jordan’s 
workforce. Agriculture makes up a plurality of the permits Syrian refugees have been 
issued. According to the ILO, “Syrian workers in all sectors, except in agriculture, must 
have identified an employer who is willing to apply for a permit on their behalf” (ILO 
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2017: 39). The lax rules for agriculture create an incentive for Syrians to enter the field, 
as it is one of the few attainable paths to legal work.  
Work permits are the legal pathways to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan; 
however, as we learned prior, this process is not always easy or affordable. As a result, 
there is a large number of Syrians joining the informal labor market. To ensure the 
previous test for significance was not due to the nature of Jordan’s informal labor, I 
conducted a similar test with the addition of estimated informal labor produced by the 
International Labour Organization in conjunction with UNHCR estimates.  
Table 6: Crosstabs—Employment Sector by Refugee Permits plus Informal labor vs. 
Jordanians actual sector work (2015) 
Work by 

















































1Source: International Labour Organization (2017:31) 
2Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/) 
Note: Due to the different classification of agriculture by Jordan’s Ministry of Labor, the Agriculture sector 
for Jordanians is counted as 0.  
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The calculated chi square value equals 33690.11, with 4 degrees of freedom giving a p-
value of less than .001. As a result, we can reject the null hypothesis and confirm that 
neither the formal nor informal labor for Syrian refugees has outcomes that resemble the 
host community. The construction sector saw the largest jump with the addition of 
informal labor, with a 21.5% increase to represent the sector with the most workers for 
Syrian refugees. As only 3% of Jordanians work in the construction sector, this appears to 
be a gap that has been largely filled by foreign, informal labor that Syrian refugees have 
helped fill. Several sectors saw a percent decrease with the addition of informal work, 
such as Restaurants (-6.8%), Agriculture (-8.1%), and Industry (-9%). A decrease could 
suggest that these sectors are more structured with better paths to formal work, and less 
friendly to informal employment. Agriculture specifically has fewer regulations for 
attaining work permits (ILO 2017: 11), resulting in the high permit numbers.  
 Overall, Syrian refugees work separately from their Jordanian counterparts. They 
are disproportionately working in different industries, as well as more informally. These 
refugees are building Jordan’s cities, and growing their crops, and serving their food. A 
plurality of Jordanians works in public administration and defense: well-paid, 
government jobs with social security and other benefits. Syrian refugees, on the other 
hand must face the financial burden of legal work, in sectors such as restaurants and the 
service industry, as well as the simplified agriculture permits (ILO 2017:31) or as they 
often opt to do, choose the informal path in construction where there are fewer job 
protections. The type of jobs, and the formality of work influence the income one makes, 
leading one to infer Syrian refugees are at a higher risk of making a lower income. The 
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following table provides an insight on the income of Syrian refugees in northern Jordan 
governorates.  
Table 7: Governorate by Income Bracket (2013) 
Governorate No Income 1-150 JOD 
Irbid 29% 51% 
Madaba 47% 20% 
Mafraq 35% 25% 
Zarqa 28% 25% 
Source: Care Inc. (Washington & Rowell 2013:13)  
A large percent, over one quarter for each governorate, make no income at all. The next 
category is less useful as it represents such a wide range of incomes, but this chart overall 
helps to reveal that the majority of Syrian refugees make 150 JOD or less, which is often 
narrowly enough to cover rent in many regions of the country.  
 This lack of integration has impacts on the economic opportunities for Syrian 
refugees and their agency to promote their own economic well-being and further 
integration into the host community. The informality of Syrian refugees’ work allows for 
lower wages, and less benefits that are required with legal work. Lower income, coupled 
with refugees often migrating with little to nothing, leaves them vulnerable to Jordan’s 
cost of living. Another divide Syrian refugees face is the rate of poverty. In Jordan, this 
equates to making less than 68 Jordanian Dinars per month. According to the World 
Bank, the overall poverty rate sits at 14.4%, compared to 86% of Syrian refugees in 
Jordan. Care international (2013) produced a report indicating the average shortfall 
between income and expenditures for Syrian refugees was 185 Jordanian Dinars (JOD). 
This shortfall prevents any wealth accumulation for this vulnerable group, and “over 67 
per cent of families are living in debt, owing on average USD 818” (3RP 2016:4). The 
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strict limits on labor integration for foreign migrants, including the especially vulnerable 
refugees in Jordan—leaves them at greater risk of poverty, and few options for socio-
economic mobility. One of the greatest drains on refugees’ funds is the high rent in 
Jordan, and this is the core of the next section of the analysis of the outcomes of 
integration.  
Housing/Community Outcomes 
 The policy areas of labor and housing are intertwined, including in Jordan where 
housing permits often require prior work permit documents. Although there are some 
waivers for refugees and ‘laissez-passers’, the two concepts are interconnected more 
broadly as well: living outside camps means refugees face the market rate rental costs in 
Jordan with their often unstable income. Low pay and poor working conditions, coupled 
with the similarly arduous residence permit process, as well as scant access to housing 
assistance or public housing, Syrian refugees are at high risk for shelter vulnerability, low 
integration, and difficulty in forming cohesive refugee communities.   
 An important aspect to housing is cost; therefore I begin this analysis by 
examining the rental costs Syrian refugees typically pay. The following table outlines 
average rents paid by Syrian refugees in northern Jordan governorates.  
Table 8: Average Monthly Rent in JOD by Governorate (2013) 
Governorate Irbid Madaba Mafraq Zarqa 
Average Rent 175 JOD 150 JOD 160 JOD 130 JOD 
Source: Care International (Washington & Rowell 2013:13) 
 
The table reveals the governorate can play a small roll in the rents a refugee will pay, but 
overall there is only a slight variance between the groups. Additionally, if we look back 
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at the income for the some of the governorates that correspond to these, a majority makes 
150 JOD or less, with a large percent making no income at all. Seeing these numbers, it is 
no surprise that Syrian refugees are going into large amounts of debt to pay for their 
livelihoods. Only 43% of Jordanians pay more than 100 JOD in rent compared to 86% of 
Syrian Refugees; facing greater restrictions to work and live, Syrian refugees also have to 
pay higher rates for residences than the average Jordanian national. The disparity in rent 
prices may result in a lack of legal protections Syrian refugees have compared to 
Jordanian nationals, allowing for landlords to raise rents in exchange for the risk of 
renting to a refugee without a permit.  
 The high rents have not always been that way, and the influx of Syrian refugees 
living in host communities has put a strain on the housing market. I examine the effects 
of the Syrian conflict on rent prices similarly to Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah (2012).  
Figure 1: Average Rent (JOD) (Consumer Price Index) by Year 
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Large flows of Syrians began arriving in 2011 and afterwards, and the rent prices made 
up a large percentage of their income, and in some cases their entire income. The price 
rises at a steady pace until 2010. I roughly use 2011 as the beginning of the Syrian 
conflict to act as a reference point for shifts in rental prices. The graph below depicts the 
percentage increase year-year during this period.  
The average year-year increase during the pre conflict period (2006-2010) falls at 
around 2.23%. The post-conflict average rent increase jumps up to 4.16%. For 2014, 
rents jumped by nearly 7% in one year. Part of the explosive rental growth could reflect 
post-conflict Sudan, where “rental incomes proved to be an attractive option for Sudanese 
nationals who already owned housing stock” and raised rents to increase profits in a high 
demand market (Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah 2012:160). After 2015, the year-year rate 
begins to level out near pre-conflict levels. This could indicate that efforts made by 
Jordan and the international community (e.g. the Jordan Compact of 2016) has had 
positive impacts on Jordan’s host communities allowing for a reprieve in the fast-paced 
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Figure 2: Year over Year Average Rent (JOD) Increase (%)  
 
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/) 
 
Influences on Rent 
 The following section utilizes map data produced by REACH, a non-
governmental organization providing humanitarian assistance in Jordan. The data covers 
around 51,832 Syrian refugees in the Northern Jordan governorates of Irbid, Mafraq, 
Jerash, and Ajloun. Collected in 2013, I analyze data regarding average rent, average 
household size, population within the basic service unit, and the governorate to 
understand and explain the outcomes for Syrian refugee communities in Jordan. I ran a 
linear regression analysis to model a relationship between average household size and the 
average rent for refugees. Due to variability between governorates, I simply focus this 
analysis on Irbid, the governorate with the largest Syrian population in Northern Jordan. I 
hypothesize the greater the household size, the lower the rent. Based on a sample of 125 
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variation in average rent influenced by average household size. For every step up in 
household size, there is an 11.88 decrease in average rent (JOD). In other words, as 
household size increases, there is a decrease in the rent Syrian refugees pay. Households 
with greater size have more costs to feed and take care of their families, so those refugees 
potentially seek out lower rents.  
Table 10: Regression Outputs—Household Size vs. Average Rent in JOD (Irbid) 
Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable=‘Irbid’) 
Correlation Coefficient .228 
R Square (Coefficient of Determination) .052 
b (slope) -11.88 
P-Value .011 
N 129 
Std. Error 3.46 
Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)  
 
 Next, I analyze the relationship between population size of Syrians in a basic 
service unit (BSU) and average rent. Again, I control for governorate by only inspecting 
the effect in Irbid. I postulate the greater the population in a basic service unit, the greater 
the average rent. After running the regression, I am 99.9% confident there is a weak to 
moderate relationship, with 9.6% of variation in average rent influenced by population 
size of Syrian refugees. For every step up in Syrian refugee population, there is a .02 
increase in average rent. The rise in rent with the influx of Syrian refugees could be a 
result of simple supply versus demand, as well from the lack of residential security for 
refugees, resulting in Syrians taking any rent they can get. The bar chart visually displays 
the average rent for each of the governorates in this data set. Irbid is the largest 
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governorate by Syrian refuge population by a large margin, and this reflects the greater 
margin in average rent between Irbid and the other governorates. This provides some 
additional, visual indication of a relationship between higher refugee population density 
and higher average rents.  
Table 11: Regression Outputs—Population (BSU) vs. Average Rent in JOD (Irbid) 
Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable=‘Irbid’) 
Correlation Coefficient .310 
R Square (Coefficient of Determination) .096 
b (slope) .020 
P-Value .000 
N 129 
Std. Error .005 
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Figure 2: Bar Chart—Average Rent in JOD by Governorate (Northern Jordan) 
Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)  
 
I run a similar analysis between the number of households in a basic service unit 
versus average rent. Likewise, I hypothesize an increase in households correlates with an 
increase in average rent. Based on a sample of 208 basic service units, I am 99.9% 
confident there is a weak relationship, with 7.7% of the variation in average rent 
explained by number of Syrian refugee households. For every additional household, there 
is a .086 (JOD) increase in average rent. This finding reflects the population and rent 
relationship; however, the slope for number of households and rent is slightly higher than 
population versus average rent. One explanation could be the large family sizes, leading 
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to high populations but fewer households straining the rental market, showing a greater 
effect of households on rent than actual population. 
Table 12: Regression Outputs—Number of households vs. Average Rent in JOD 
(Northern Jordan) 
Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable=‘Irbid’) 
Correlation Coefficient .277 
R Square (Coefficient of Determination) .077 
b (slope) .086 
P-Value .000 
N 208 
Std. Error .021 
Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)  
 
Access to Community Formation 
 These high cost rents and low wages force refugees in Jordan to live without 
shelter security, and face a high risk of eviction. Their status as foreign migrants, or 
temporary residents leaves them in legally precarious situations as tenants. As a result, 
over 40% of Syrian refugees stated they had moved three or more times within the last 
year (NRC 2015:13). This is compared to only 4% of Jordanians having moved at least 
once in the last year (JDOS). Syrian refugees precarious position leaves them in a 
constant state of displacement, without a chance to accrue wealth or build community. 
This leads to the “social dislocation” Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah discuss in post-
conflict Sudan (2012:153). They must constantly find cheaper rent to afford the high cost 
of living in Jordan. Concurrently, “70% of Syrian refugees do not have secure tenure, 
with many households renting without basic rental agreements” (Goyes, Tolgay & Vidal 
2016:4). The lack of agreements leaves Syrian refugees particularly vulnerable to forced 
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evictions. This is compounded when renting without a permit, or updated permit—
associated with the strict policy discussed in the policy analysis.  
The previous findings that a greater population of Syrians and Syrian households 
correlates with higher rents incentivize Syrian refugees to disperse, as opposed to 
residentially concentrating into enclave communities. As a result, Syrians struggle to 
form areas resembling an ethnic enclave or receive the social mobility those communities 
can foster due to high rents and evictions. The lack of formal legal rights regarding 
foreigners in terms of housing leaves Syrian refugees in a vulnerable and desperate 
position to find affordable housing. The inability to form cohesive communities as 
refugees can have negative implications for their integration into the labor market, and 
their longer-term spatial integration (Schneider & Crul 2010; Wessel et al. 2017).  
Discussion 
 This paper has investigated the policies and outcomes regarding integration of 
Jordan’s Syrian refugee population into the housing and labor markets and their access to 
successful integration within the Kingdom generally. This analysis illustrates how 
policies can align—or sometimes misalign—with outcomes in the context of refugee 
issues. The results indicate a somewhat negative outlook for the Syrian refugee 
population in Jordan; however, recent policies have shown the Hashemite Kingdom 
potentially reversing its stance towards refugees; time is necessary to see how these 
policies are enforced and if they reflect a trend of friendly policies, or the only attempt to 
aid refugees in exchange for international aid.  
 I first examine the policy history of refugee policies in Jordan through a lens of 
path dependency. Jordan’s history with refugees is long in comparison to most countries. 
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The Hashemite Kingdom is home to one of the largest populations of the Palestinian 
diaspora, to which it granted citizenship to a select majority. Although they granted 
citizenship, this was dependent upon King’ Abdullah’s desire for expansion into the West 
Bank. Other than this gesture, Jordan’s refugee policies have a path dependency towards 
taking away rights and assistance to their large, and continuously growing refugee 
population.  
 I find the recent and slight policy reversal towards promoting refugees within the 
Kingdom through the Jordan compact a result of foreign influence taking in a percent of 
the costs. Due to the long history of these policies, these costs would normally be too 
high to reverse according to path dependency theory (Levi 1997:28). The Western 
countries that provided the most concessions have much to gain from greater acceptance 
of refugees into Global South countries. By aiding countries that take in a 
disproportionate amount of the world’s global refugee population, they effectively escape 
their moral obligation to take in a refugee population into their borders. The path 
dependency of Jordan’s refugee policies should make observers weary of accepting the 
Jordan Compact as an institutional shift in their acceptance of refugees as a legitimate, 
permanent population within their borders.  
 I then shift my focus to the actual policy analysis of Jordan’s refugee policy, 
assessing specifically the housing and labor market policies through an integration lens 
for refugees. My results overall correspond to my expected scenario. The Labor policy 
assessment received a ‘halfway favorable’ score on the MIPEX index, slightly higher 
than expected. The score is a result of Jordan’s restrictive work permits process (besides 
the agriculture sector) as well as the closed professions list the Ministry of Labor upholds 
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against a majority of foreigners. The score is slightly higher than I anticipated, due to the 
rights indicator not reflecting the realities of Jordan’s labor market The restrictive work 
permit process and reality of informality of labor in Jordan negate the rights granted to 
legal foreign workers in Jordan.  
 The housing policy assessment assumed a relatively low score as well due to 
Jordan’s historical context of negative refugee policies regime. The assessment followed 
suit, and received a lower ‘slightly unfavorable’ score on the Migrant Integration Policy 
Index. Jordan has essentially no long term or permanent pathway to residency for 
foreigners, and this includes its host community refugees. This corresponds with their 
referral to refugees as ‘temporary guests’. Additionally, residential permit renewal is 
equally arduous as the initial permit request, as well as required for each change of 
address: potentially leading to renting without a permit due to lack of documentation or 
funds. This informal landlord-tenant relationship forming from strict policies leaves 
Syrian refugees vulnerable to forced evictions, and poor services.  
 The tool utilized for the policy assessment—the Migrant Integration Policy 
Index—was produced to understand how policies affect integration of migrants into 
mostly European states. The specific issues refugees face compared to the typical migrant 
makes the use of MIPEX imperfect, but the overlap is large enough to provide an 
accurate analysis of the policies in regards to refugees in Jordan. 
 I conduct the policy analysis prior to the outcome analysis to provide a context 
within the outcomes can be understood. The first part of the outcomes analysis examines 
Syrian refugees’ integration into the Jordanian labor market, postulating a reflection (or 
substandard) of the relatively negative policies. I first examine integration into the labor 
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force generally through unemployment data, controlling for pre-conflict Syria 
unemployment rates. The high disparity between both pre-conflict Syria and current 
Jordanian unemployment rate (Syrian refugees having a much higher unemployment rate) 
leads to assuming the postulation as true: Syrian refugees are not integrated into labor in 
a broad sense. I turn to quality of work by way of informality of work—especially 
pertinent for a country with a large informal sector. While Jordan’s host communities 
have a large informal sector, Syrian refugees nearly double this proportion: a sign that 
those Syrians that are working are not working at the same quality—or with the same 
benefits as legal work (i.e. social security, work contracts etc.).  
 I continue the labor integration analysis by looking for a segregation of labor by 
sector. Utilizing a chi-square test of independence, I found that both formally and 
informally, Syrian refugees significantly work in different sectors than their Jordanian 
counterparts. This corresponds to the policy analysis and postulated outcome, due to 
Jordan’s closed jobs list deliberately barring Syrian refugees (and all foreign migrants) 
from a number of occupations that only Jordanians can fill. Additionally, Syrian refugees 
must, for the most part, find employers willing to represent them for the expensive work 
permit process, or willing to risk hiring them illegally. This follows the institutional 
context of work in Jordan, in which there is a divide between public and private work 
among Jordanian nationals and refugees, refugee-citizens, and foreigners.  
 The postulation Syrian refugees make little to no income follows the previous 
findings about their ability to find work, as well as the quality of the work. Utilizing 
descriptive data on Northern governorates income brackets. Of the four governorates, all 
had at least ¼ of Syrian refugees without a consistent income, with one (Madaba) at 
Refugee Integration  48 
nearly 50%. These figures have lead to this group’s high poverty rate compared to the 
host community, as well as the high proportion of families taking on debt. After 
examining all of these indicators of labor integration outcomes, I confidently conclude 
that Jordan’s labor policies—as well as the institutional framework—have negatively 
affected the actual labor integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan’s labor market.  
 The ability for Syrian refugees to access Jordan’s labor market has a direct impact 
on their ability to afford market rate housing, making the housing outcomes analysis the 
next logical step in this paper. Additionally, the connection between migrants’ ability to 
form ethnic communities and ability to integrate economically allows for a final analysis 
of the future of Syrian refugees long-term success. I assume a similarly negative outcome 
for Syrian refugee integration into the housing market due to the corresponding policy 
analysis, as well as the previous findings for the labor market outcomes analysis.  
 I begin the rent analysis with a descriptive set of average rent figures for Northern 
Jordan governorates (due to the nature of available data, much of this section analyzes 
this region; it is also where the largest concentration of refugees reside). The results 
reveal a correlation between governorate and cost of housing. When compared to 
Jordan’s host community, Syrian refugees actually pay higher rates than their host 
counterparts—a possible outcome of their lack of security in housing rights, leading to 
landlord-renter exploitation of a marginal group. I utilize Consumer Price Index data on 
rent prices on a year-year basis to understand the Syrian conflict’s impact on Jordan’s 
rental market. I find that rent increases follow developments in Syria and Jordan, with 
rents sharply increasing after the conflict, and slowing down by the past two years—
either a result of efforts by Jordan (Jordan Compact) or a slowdown in Syrian refugees 
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crossing over into Jordan. This presents a positive outlook for distressed Syrian refugees 
facing rising rents for the majority of their time in Jordan.  
 To further the understanding of rent increases in Jordan, explicitly Syrian 
refugees’ rents, I utilize REACH International’s data collected on Northern Jordan 
governorates’ rents and households. I make three hypotheses based on Greulich, Quigley, 
and Raphael’s assertion that “a large influx of immigrants may result in substantial 
increases in housing prices and rents in those areas” (2004:150). The three hypotheses are 
as follows:  
(1) As average household size increases, average rent decreases. 
(2) An increase in BSU population correlates with an increase in average rent. 
(3) As number of households in a BSU increases, average rent increases. 
Utilizing linear regressions for all three hypotheses, the results corresponded statistically 
significantly with the expected outcomes. The results reveal that household size impacts 
where residents live in order to find lower rents for their larger families. Additionally, a 
greater population of Syrian refugees, as well as number of households positively 
correlates with income, likely resulting from the increased pressure Syrian refugees place 
on housing.  
 I finally turn my attention to Syrian refugees’ ability to concentrate and form 
enclaves, while problematic in some ways (including initial spatial integration), they have 
been a demonstrated mechanism for  mobility ladders and economic and spatial 
integration. For this analysis, I examine Syrian refugees’ security of tenure as renters, in 
addition to utilizing previous findings. The rate Syrian refugees state they have moved 
within the last year far outnumbers Jordanians. Syrian refugees stated they had moved 
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homes (at least three times) at forty times the rate Jordanians had moved once within the 
last year. This creates a challenge for the formation of community or kinship ties with 
other community members as refugees are in a constant state of displacement due to high 
rents and low housing security from a policy standpoint. The additional findings that 
greater population/households leading to higher rents creates a disincentive for Syrian 
refugees to concentrate in these areas as they cannot afford rents as it is.  
 This last finding has long-term implications for the success of Syrian refugees in 
Jordan in terms of labor market integration and eventually spatial integration. The 
immediate Syrian refugee dispersal means they skip a typical step in immigrant and 
refugee integration: ethnic enclave formation. While spatial segregation into enclaves 
inherently opposes spatial integration, it has often been a necessary prerequisite for 
integration into the labor market for immigrant communities, which is a necessary step 
for spatial integration across class lines (Schneider & Crul 2010:1144; Wessel et al. 
2017:831). Without these enclaves to provide mobility ladders for integration into the 
labor market, the long-term spatial integration for Syrian refugees seems negligible. 
Unfortunately this paper is, for the most part, unable to assess the affects the more recent 
Jordan Compact has on Syrian’s housing outcomes; there are indicators (slowdown in 
rent increases) that positive outcomes will arise to allow for communities to form. 
Due to the inability to actually travel to Jordan and collect data, the methodology 
is at mercy to available data on the Internet. Fortunately, Jordan’s department of statistics 
provides comprehensive data on Jordan by year—including recent data from 2017--on 
areas specific to this study, such as rental, unemployment, and labor statistics. This is a 
sufficient resource for understanding Jordan’s host communities, but has limited data 
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regarding refugees specifically (reflecting their policies lack of refugee references). This 
obligates a reliance on data collected by a variety of actors for refugees, which often do 
not have data as current as would be ideal.  
Most data was collected most currently in 2015, and some in 2013 (REACH’s 
map data, among others). This necessitates the methodology to avoid referencing the 
Jordan Compact in the policy analysis because the outcome data will not represent post-
compact outcomes. Additionally, the REACH data does not provide geographic size of 
the Basic Service Units (BSUs), making an analysis (and controlling for) of density and 
other geographic analyses impossible for this study. 
 Finally, I conclude a relationship among all three sections of the analysis. I 
maintain that the historical/institutional framework of refugees in Jordan inform the 
policies that are imposed upon them. These policies perpetuate their institutional inability 
to participate in policy formation/reform through their negative outcomes on integration 
into the Jordanian host communities and labor markets. The policies and institutions that 
create roadblocks to ethnic enclave formation, which is their path to success, bar Syrian 
refugees from this: labor market incorporation and spatial integration. As a result, the 
status quo is perpetual; the Jordan Compact may marginally help Syrian refugees find 
work, but this is not sufficient for integration without institutional reform.  
Conclusion 
 Sociologist Matthew Desmond recently wrote in Evicted: “it is hard to argue that 
housing is not a fundamental human need. Decent, affordable housing should be a basic 
right for everybody in this country. The reason is simple: without stable shelter, 
everything else falls apart.” (2016:300). Although he is writing about US citizens in poor 
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neighborhoods of Milwaukee, Desmond gets at the heart of the need for stable housing 
for everybody, especially those in marginalized positions: it is the bedrock of life; 
without it, life falls apart. We can also take it a step further, arguing for accessibility to 
not just housing, but also a healthy community.  
Jordan’s policies towards a population recently torn from their homes in often 
dramatic and traumatizing fashion (Washington & Rowell 2013, table 4:12) disregards 
these notions of housing justice. Fortunately, it does accept (nearly) all refugees into its 
borders, accepting the international law of non-refoulement. Once across the border, 
however, refugees find themselves in a state of stagnation with few routes for growth or 
integration. By accepting large segments of refugees but not promoting integration, 
Jordan has created a policy of a divided state: one of Jordanian nationals, and one of a 
growing and disenfranchised forcibly displaced population. This paper provides insights 
into how historical and institutional contexts from policies that affect the communities of 
a country.  
While it is easy to critique the policies affecting refugees in a country that has a 
large refugee population, it ignores the need for countries everywhere to start committing 
a fair share to taking in, and housing the world’s refugees. Jordan’s refugee policy regime 
may have negative connotations (something worth noting and critiquing) it must be in 
conjunction with an understanding of other solutions to the issues refugees face, such as 
resettlement to Global North states after arrival to Jordan, as well as repatriation when 
applicable. Jordan is the country with the largest proportion of refugees to national 
population, reflecting the greater trend of refugees from the Global South forcibly 
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displaced for extended periods of time into other countries of the Global South: into low 
and middle income countries such as Jordan.  
The findings in this study examined what happens after forced migrants arrive to 
their destination, but I call for increased research into the causes of refugee crises for an 
improved understanding in proactive preventative measures, as well as the Global 
North’s role in the global refugee crises: potential causation and reaction. Assessing the 
situation reactively is important and must be continued to improve the conditions of 
today’s current refugees, and more research must be conducted employing theory as a 
foundation; moreover, research must be done in tandem to prevent these conflicts that 
create refugees. Preventative measures, and a greater response by the Global North in 
accepting refugees into their borders can provide a chance for Jordan to pro-actively 
reform its refugee policy regime for the promotion of equality among all residents within 
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Appendix I: Labor Market Integration Index 
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Appendix II: Housing Policy Integration Index Score Card 
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